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AIRCRAFT SALES, INC., a Utah 
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TRANS-WEST AIRCRAFT SALES, INC., 
Cross-claimant and Appellant, 
-vs.-
THE CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, a 
Kansas corporation, 
Cross-defendant and 
Respondent. 
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ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
Respondent The Cessna Aircraft Company (CESSNA) respectfully 
submits that the Court of Appeals erred in its OPINION remanding 
this case to the district court in that it{ 
1. Reversed the district court's gra^ vt of summary judgment 
in favor of CESSNA when the material facts upon which CESSNA'S 
motion was based were admittedly uncontrov^rted and fully sup-
ported CESSNA'S motion; and 
2. Allowed appellants Trans-West Aircraft Sales, Inc. 
(TRANS-WEST) to raise a contention of errot for the first time on 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts material to a review of the above issues are: 
1. On March 1, 1985 CESSNA filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment based on TRANS-WESTfs answers to Certain discovery 
requests (R. 001253-71). 
2. On March 21, 1985 CESSNA filed a Fre-hearing Submittal 
in support of its motion citing the district court to certain 
facts in the record (R. 001276-80). 
3. On September 16, 1985, TRANS-WEST filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment (001366-7) and a memorandum in support thereof 
(001328-57), which although not styled as also being in opposi-
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tion to CESSNA'S motion for summary judgment, countered positions 
CESSNA had been urging in defense of TRANS-WEST?s cross-claim. 
POINT SIX of TRANS-WEST's memorandum was "THE LAW OF INDEMNIFICA-
TION DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT THE CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES BE FULLY 
ADJUDICATED BEFORE THE PASSIVE DEFENDANT MAY MAINTAIN HIS ACTION 
FOR INDEMNIFICATION." (R. 001353). 
4. On October 3, 1985, CESSNA renewed its Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 001380-2) and fi^ed a memorandum in support 
thereof and in opposition to TRANS-WESTfs motion for summary 
judgment (R. 001383-98). Uncontroverted Fact No. 9 thereof 
stated: 
On February 14, 1985, plaintiffs executed a 
Release of All Claims, forever discharging 
defendants, including CESSNA, CESSNA FINANCE 
and TRANS WEST, from all claims arising from 
plaintiffs' purchase or use of the subject 
aircraft. The Release of All Claims specifi-
cally states: 
fIT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND 
AGREED that this settlement is a 
compromise of a contingent and un-
liquidated claim and that payment 
thereof is not to be construed as 
an admission of liability on the 
part of those released, by whom 
liability is expressly denied.' 
and POINT TWO of the memorandum raised the issue that TRANS-WEST 
had not shown that it is entitled to indemnification, stating: 
Even under the authorities advanced by TRANS-
WEST, a retailer must show that the manufac-
turer supplied a defective product which 
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caused injury to the plaintiff, before the 
issue of the retailer's right to indemnifica-
tion can be addressed, (R. 001395). 
5. TRANS-WEST filed no memorandum in opposition to CESSNA'S 
memorandum in support of its motion for sublunary judgment, nor did 
it request additional time to file affidavits or to conduct 
additional discovery to oppose CESSNA'S motion, as it could have 
done under Rule 56(f), U.R.C.P. 
6. On December 5, 1985, Judge Dee of the district court 
heard the reciprocal motions for summary judgment and took them 
under advisement (R. 001400), and on January 9, 1986 entered a 
Judgment of Dismissal of Cross-claim which granted CESSNA'S and 
Cessna Finance Corporation's motions for summary judgment and 
denied TRANS-WEST's motion for summary judgment (R. 001401-3). 
7. At no time prior to the hearing or thereafter, or after 
the judgment of dismissal had been entered, did TRANS-WEST con-
tend it would be error to grant CESSNA'S motion for summary judg-
ment, if TRANS-WESTfs motion for summary judgment was denied --
and at no time while before the district court did TRANS-WEST 
request a trial on the issue of whether or not the aircraft was 
defective, or claim that the district court committed error in 
not sua sponte setting the case for trial v^ hen denying TRANS-
WEST'S motion for summary judgment. 
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8. The first time TRANS-WEST referred to its present con-
tention that it was error for the district court not to require a 
trial of the issue of the aircraft's alleged defectiveness was in 
its STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE PRESENTED TO THE SUPREME COURT (R. 
001408-10) wherein it stated: 
Appellant shall present to the Supreme Court 
the issue of whether or not, . . . and, al-
ternatively, whether or not the Trial Court 
erred in not permitting appellant a trial on 
the issue of the negligent manufacture of the 
product in question or the breach of warran-
ties if that determination was required be-
fore appellant would be entitled to indem-
nification. 
9. At POINT THREE of Respondent's Brief, CESSNA called to 
the Court's attention the fact that TRANS-WEST was raising for 
the first time on appeal the claim that it had been denied its 
right to a trial on the issue of defectiveness of the aircraft in 
question by the following language: 
TRANS-WEST now takes the position of demand-
ing a trial on the question of whether the 
aircraft was defective. . . . TRANS-WEST is 
not now entitled to a trial on the issue 
since it not only failed to request it in the 
court below, but affirmatively asserted that 
such a trial was unnecessary due to the ab-
sence of any material questions of fact 
necessary to decide the issue raised by its 
motion for summary judgment. It is fundamen-
tal that a party may not claim as error a 
position raised for the first time on appeal. 
(authorities cited). (Respondent's Brief pp. 
16-17). 
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10. This Court at page 8 of its OPINION correctly states: 
Settlement of the underlying product liabil-
ity action does not preclude indemnification 
(authorities cited). If, howeveif, in reach-
ing the settlement agreement, tho manufac-
turer does not admit it furnishe4 a defective 
product, the trial court must resolve this 
issue before determining liability for attor-
ney's fees, costs and expenses. 
but then states in its ANALYSIS at page 13 that "[t]he trial 
court's granting of Cessna and Cessna Finance's motions for 
summary judgment was premature," which has the effect of re-
quiring Cessna to show that the aircraft wds not defective as an 
element of its entitlement for summary judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR CESSNA 
SINCE TRANS-WEST DID NOT PROVE Ills ENTITLE-
MENT TO INDEMNIFICATION. 
Prior to appeal, TRANS-WEST, apparently hoping to avoid the 
substantial expense of attempting to prove "defectiveness" of the 
aircraft, always took the position that it did not need to show 
that the aircraft in question was defective as an element of its 
right to indemnification against CESSNA fori its attorney's fees 
and expenses in defending against plaintiffs' claims. In POINT 
SIX of its memorandum in support of its morion for summary judg-
ment (R. 001353), TRANS-WEST misapplies Rule 13(f), U.R.C.P., 
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regarding the maintenance of a cross-claim prior to judgment in 
the principal action as support for the proposition that showing 
the liability of CESSNA (that the aircraft was defective) is not 
necessary to its case. CESSNA raised the lack of a defectiveness 
finding as a defense to TRANS-WESTfs motion for summary judgment 
in CESSNA'S memorandum in support of its motion for summary 
judgment and in opposition to TRANS-WEST's motion for summary 
judgment by specifically pointing out at R. 001395 that 
[e]ven under the authorities advanced by 
TRANS WEST, a retailer must show that the 
manufacturer supplied a defective product 
which caused injury to the plaintiff, before 
the issue of a retailer's right to indemnifi-
cation can be addressed. 
TRANS-WEST made no response to said defense, did not file an 
opposition or reply memorandum to CESSNA'S memorandum in support 
of CESSNA'S motion and in opposition to TRANS-WEST's motion for 
summary judgment (R. 001383-98), did not request addition time or 
discovery under Rule 56(f), U.C.R.P., and did not request a trial 
on the issue of defectiveness, but steadfastly pursued its motion 
for summary judgment to hearing based upon twenty-six alleged 
"Incontroverted Facts" (R. 001328-35), none of which referred to 
any admission or finding that the aircraft in question was defec-
tive. 
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The Court's Opinion seems to ignore the fact that CESSNA had 
a reciprocal motion for summary judgment pending before the 
district court which was granted. Since T$ANS-WEST had not 
proved that the aircraft was defective, anrl had not requested 
additional time or discovery to attempt to prove defectiveness, 
CESSNA'S motion for summary judgment was timely and mature, and 
the same was properly granted by the district court. As stated 
at Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P., 
. . . When a motion for summary judgment is 
made and supported as provided iii this rule, 
an adverse party may not rest uppn the mere 
allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavit or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set tforth spe-
cific facts showing that there i^ a genuine 
issue for trial. If he does not so respond, 
summary judgment, if appropriate,! shall be 
entered against him. 
It is clear from the record that TRANS-WEST never considered 
a showing of defectiveness to be necessary to its motion for 
summary judgment and it never attempted to prove such. It based 
its motion upon twenty-six alleged "Uncontrfoverted Facts," some 
of which improperly cited only the testimony of TRANS-WEST's 
owner in support thereof, but it did not evfen attempt to show 
that the aircraft was defective, only that the plaintiffs had 
alleged that it was in their complaint. 
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For this Court to now, in effect, say -- TRANS-WEST you 
should have attempted to prove defectiveness and we are going to 
let you try again to make your case, while totally ignoring the 
fact that CESSNA had made a reciprocal motion for summary judg-
ment and that both parties were satisfied with the state of the 
record at the time their respective motions were heard, was 
totally unwarranted and unprecedented. 
The Court should modify its Opinion to acknowledge the 
procedural state of the record at the time the reciprocal motions 
for summary judgment were heard to the effect that (1) TRANS-WEST 
had never attempted to prove defectiveness of the aircraft, (2) 
such a finding is necessary to a cause of action for implied 
indemnity for costs of defense, (3) CESSNA had a defensive motion 
for summary judgment pending, (4) TRANS-WEST had not requested 
additional time or discovery to oppose CESSNA'S motion, and (5) 
since TRANS-WEST had failed to prove that the aircraft was defec-
tive, the district court properly granted CESSNA'S motion for 
summary judgment. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PERMITTING 
TRANS-WEST TO RAISE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL THE CONTENTION OF ERROR THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT DID NOT REQUIRE A TRIAL ON THE ISSUE OF 
DEFECTIVENESS. 
TRANS-WEST acknowledges in its brief (pp. 34-35) that 
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[t]hese issues (defectiveness ancjl whether 
TRANS-WEST was only a passive patty) were set 
down for trial by the trial court, but then 
both parties filed motions for summary judg-
ment and the court struck the trial date and 
upon ruling in favor of CESSNA dismissed 
TRANS-WEST's cause of action, . < . . 
Emphasis added. TRANS-WEST failed to showj and cannot show, that 
it opposed CESSNA'S motion for summary judgment by filing a 
memorandum in opposition thereto or requesting further time or 
discovery under Rule 56(f), U.R.C.P. in which to respond to 
CESSNA'S motion. Likewise, TRANS-WEST failed to show, and cannot 
show, any request to the district court for trial on the issue of 
defectiveness either before or after the district court granted 
CESSNA'S motion for summary judgment. 
Since TRANS-WEST filed a motion for summary judgment and did 
not object to CESSNA'S motion for summary judgment being heard at 
the same time, it cannot claim as error th^ fact that the dis-
trict court heard the reciprocal motions fcjr summary judgment on 
December 5, 1985 (R. 001400); and not havihg filed any supple-
mental memorandum or request for trial before the district court 
entered judgment in CESSNA'S favor of Janu^ -ry 9, 1986, TRANS-WEST 
cannot cite as error the procedural fact that the district court 
ruled on CESSNA'S motion on January 9, 198$ (R. 001401-3). And 
since TRANS-WEST did not even attempt to show defectiveness, a 
critical issue under any theory of implied indemnity, it cannot 
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cite as substantive error the fact that the district court 
granted CESSNA'S motion for summary judgment which was properly 
before it. TRANS-WEST, in effect, merely says at page 35 of its 
brief -- if the Court disagrees with me and finds that a showing 
of defectiveness is necessary, then please send the case back to 
the district court and let me take another shot at it. TRANS-
WEST does not in its brief, nor does this Court in its Opinion, 
explain why it was error for the district court to grant CESSNA'S 
motion for summary judgment, or why it was error for the district 
court to not require a trial which was never requested after the 
reciprocal motions for summary judgment were filed. Even after 
the district court had entered its judgment in CESSNA'S favor, 
TRANS-WEST made no attempt to seek relief therefrom under Rule 
60(b), U.R.C.P. It could have at least claimed "excusable neg-
lect" in not advising the court that it wanted a trial on the 
merits in the event its motion was not granted. 
In sum, TRANS-WEST at no time and in no way advised the 
district court that it wanted a trial on the issue of defective-
ness, or of its contention that it would be error if the court 
did not give it one. CESSNA at page 17 of its brief cited Utah 
County v. Brown, 672 P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1983) and Franklin Finan-
cial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 
1983) for the proposition that a party cannot claim as error a 
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position raised for the first time on appeal. This proposition 
was recently reaffirmed by the Utah Supreme Court in Zions First 
National Bank v. National American Title Insurance Co., 749 P.2d 
651, 654 (Utah 1988) wherein the Court observed and held: 
National American's third claim on appeal is 
that an agency relationship existed between 
Jeffrey Olson and Zions and that as a result, 
Jeffrey's knowledge of the forgery should be 
imputed to Zions. This claim has been raised 
on appeal for the first time. Generally, we 
do not consider issues that were not pre-
sented to the trial court. (authorities 
cited). National American urges that there 
is no sound policy reason for our not con-
sidering this issue. National American ac-
knowledges that agency is generally a ques-
tion of fact for the trial court, but con-
tends that when the facts on which an issue 
may be determined are undisputed and those 
facts do not permit the drawing of con-
flicting inferences, all that remains is a 
legal question. Because we do not defer to 
trial court's determinations of legal ques-
tions, National American contends that we are 
as well situated as the trial court to deal 
with the issue. 
National American's position ignores one 
of the reasons for refusing to consider any 
matter for the first time on appeal, even a 
matter of law. Although we may not defer to 
a trial court's conclusion on a legal ques-
tion, we certainly may derive great benefit 
from the trial judge's views on t^ ie issues 
and may be persuaded by those views. This 
provides ample justification for refusing to 
consider National American's clai^ n. 
CESSNA submits that there is no just reason why this Court 
should permit TRANS-WEST to raise for the first time on appeal 
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the contention that it was not afforded a trial on the issue of 
defectiveness, which it affirmatively negated by filing a motion 
for summary judgment and never thereafter requested. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court's OPINION reversing the district court's granting 
of summary judgment in favor of CESSNA shows only why the dis-
trict court could not have granted TRANS-WEST's motion for sum-
mary judgment, which it did not. It does not show why CESSNA was 
not entitled to the granting of its motion for summary judgment. 
CESSNA'S motion was not procedurally opposed and was substan-
tively sound since TRANS-WEST had not shown that the aircraft in 
question was defective. Both parties were satisfied with the 
state of the record at the time they filed their respective 
motions. TRANS-WEST never requested additional time or discovery 
to oppose CESSNA'S motion, and did not object to the district 
court hearing both motions at the same time, nor did TRANS-WEST 
seek any post-trial relief from the judgment granting CESSNA'S 
motion for summary judgment, including a request for trial on the 
issue of defectiveness of the aircraft in question. 
TRANS-WESTfs request for trial of the issue of defectiveness 
was raised for the first time on appeal and there is no legal 
justification for this Court to reverse the district court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of CESSNA to provide TRANS-
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WEST a second chance to prove its case. The district court 
committed no legal error in granting CESSNA'S motion for summary 
judgment and that judgment should be affirmed. 
CESSNA respectfully requests this Court to modify its Opin-
ion to correctly reflect the fact that both motions for summary 
judgment were properly before the district court for hearing and 
since TRANS-WEST failed to prove the critical issue of defective-
ness, the district court properly granted CfESSNA's motion for 
summary judgment and TRANS-WEST cannot now complain for the first 
time on appeal that it was not afforded a trial on the defective-
ness issue. 
CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL 
Counsel for CESSNA certifies that this Petition for Re-
hearing has not been filed for the purpose of delay, but to 
correct what counsel perceives to be a procedural error in the 
Court's Opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11th day df July, 1988. 
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH 
of and for 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake Citjy, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four (4) true and correct copies of 
the foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING OF RESPONDENT THE CESSNA 
AIRCRAFT COMPANY was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following 
counsel of record this 11th day of July, 1988: 
Paul N. Cotro-Manes, Esq. 
311 South State St., Suite 280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
Of Respondentf s Counsel 
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